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Patrick Galdieri 
Protecting Bloggers: The Federal Media Shield is Actually a Sword 
 
Section I 
Introduction 
In recent years, various federal media shield bills encountered inevitable criticism which 
ultimately led to their demise.  That criticism has largely centered on definitional concerns in 
light of evolving online entities, perhaps most notably blogs.  While internet premised arguments 
against a federal media shield once held merit, they are no longer convincing, as Congress has 
modified the legislation. 
The particular issue discussed in this paper is that the Free Flow of Information Act of 
2013 (hereinafter, “FFIA”) appropriately protects bloggers’ confidentiality right for their 
sources.  This subject is particularly germane following the Senate Judiciary Committee’s recent 
FFIA amendment approval which delineates the bill’s scope of coverage.  That decision elicited 
conflicting responses from the internet community, ranging from staunch disapproval to ardent 
support.  This paper takes the position that the FFIA as amended overcomes prior concerns, 
protecting bloggers and the online community alike. 
This paper will address the various topics demonstrating the FFIA’s protection of 
bloggers in the following order: Section II will discuss the historical progression towards a 
federal media shield, Section III will discuss arguments purporting definitional concerns 
regarding coverage of bloggers with rebuttals to those arguments, Section IV will discuss recent 
examples of unprotected bloggers with arguments that the FFIA would have provided protection, 
and Section V will discuss media shield laws’ impact on bloggers at the state level. 
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Section II 
The Progression towards a Federal Media Shield 
There is no federal statute to protect a reporter’s qualified or conditional right to refuse to 
reveal confidential sources.
1
  Consequently, the First Amendment governs the extent of the 
reporters’ privilege under federal law.2  The Supreme Court of the United States has confronted 
the issue of “whether requiring newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries 
abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment.”3  In Branzburg, a 
reporter wrote a detailed article involving observations of two drug dealers manufacturing 
drugs.
4
  The reporter was then subpoenaed by a grand jury and refused to identify the two drug 
dealers discussed in the article.
5
  The Supreme Court rejected the reporter’s argument of 
privilege under state law and required that he appear before the grand jury and answer 
questioning.
6
  Still, Branzburg suggested federal enactment of a reporters’ privilege, specifically 
providing that: 
At the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory 
newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules 
as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned and, 
equally important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time may 
dictate.
7
 
 
Branzburg noted that there is “merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment 
limits, to fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect to the 
relations between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas.”8  Moreover, 
                                                          
1
 See Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 206 N.J. 209, 226 (2011). 
2
 Id. 
3
 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972). 
4
 Id. 
5
 Id. at 667-668. 
6
 Id. at 709. 
7
 Id. at 706. 
8
 Id. 
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Branzburg recognized that the First Amendment “comprehends every sort of publication which 
affords a vehicle of information and opinion.”9 
Following Branzburg, several federal appeals courts acknowledged a conditional 
reporters’ privilege in varying contexts such as libel suits and civil actions to which the reporter 
was not a party.
10
 However, the turn of the century paralleled federal courts’ growing 
apprehension to identify a constitutionally based reporters’ privilege.11  Representative of such 
apprehension was Seventh Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner’s opinion in which he provided that 
“[w]e do not see why there needs to be special criteria merely because the possessor of the 
documents or other evidence sought is a journalist.”12  That 2003 opinion signified the federal 
courts’ transition to reject a constitutionally based reporters’ privilege.13  So, the news media 
turned to Congress for a reporters’ shield law as federal actions increasingly imposed fines and 
jail time.
14
 
Over the last ten years, several media shield bills have died in Congress.
15
  But there is 
presently a media shield bill, the Free Flow of Information Act of 2013 (hereinafter “FFIA”), 
which recently passed the Senate Judiciary Committee and now awaits a full vote in the Senate.
16
 
The FFIA’s stated purpose is “[t]o maintain the free flow of information to the public by 
providing conditions for the federally compelled disclosure of information by certain persons 
                                                          
9
 Id. at 704. 
10
 See Jane E. Kirtley, Mask, Shield, and Sword: Should the Journalist's Privilege Protect the Identity of Anonymous 
Posters to News Media Websites?, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1478, 1500 (2010). 
11
 Id. at 1501. 
12
 Id (quoting McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
13
 Id. 
14
 Id. at 1502. 
15
 See Emily Bazelon, Better Than No Shield At All, Slate.com (Sep. 24, 2013, 1:23 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/09/media_shield_law_matt_drudge_is_wrong_
the_senate_bill_is_pretty_good.html. 
16
 See Bazelon, supra note 15. 
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connected with the news media.”17  The FFIA prohibits any entity or employee of the judicial or 
executive branch or an administrative agency of the federal government, in any matter arising 
under federal law, from compelling a covered person to testify or produce any document related 
to information obtained or created as part of engaging in journalism unless a court makes 
specified determinations.
18
 
In both criminal and civil cases, to overcome the prohibition the court is required to make 
a determination by a preponderance of the evidence that “the party seeking to compel disclosure 
of the protected information has exhausted all reasonable alternative sources of the protected 
information.”19 
Unique to civil cases, the court must additionally determine by a preponderance of the 
evidence that “the protected information sought is essential to the resolution of the matter” and 
that “the interest in compelling disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in gathering and 
disseminating the information or news at issue and maintaining the free flow of information.”20 
Unique to criminal cases, the court must additionally determine by a preponderance of 
the evidence that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has occurred” and that 
“there are reasonable grounds to believe that the protected information sought is essential to the 
investigation or prosecution or to the defense against the prosecution.”21  Such a determination 
shifts the burden to the covered person to show “by clear and convincing evidence that 
disclosure of the protected information would be contrary to the public interest, taking into 
                                                          
17
 See Tracking the U.S. Congress, GovTrack.us (May 16, 2013), 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s987/text. 
18
 See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013). 
19
 See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013). 
20
 See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013). 
21
 See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013). 
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account both the public interest in gathering and disseminating the information or news at issue 
and maintaining the free flow of information and the public interest in compelling disclosure.”22 
Furthermore, the prohibition does not apply to information “necessary to stop, prevent, or 
mitigate a specific case of death, kidnapping, substantial bodily harm, conduct that constitutes a 
criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor, and incapacitation or destruction of 
critical infrastructure.”23  Finally, the FFIA includes a national security exception.  So the 
prohibition does not apply if the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
classified information sought would “materially assist the federal government in preventing or 
mitigating an act of terrorism or other acts that are reasonably likely to cause significant and 
articulable harm to national security.”24 
The compromise amendment of the FFIA, which passed the Senate Judiciary Committee 
in September 2013, establishes the bill’s definition of “journalist” and “covered journalist.”25 In 
other words, the amendment delineates who is protected by the shield.  Congress has faced a 
great deal of criticism in the past in defining who is covered by the bill in in light of modern 
internet reporting.  This paper will address the arguments against a federal shield law in the 
context of internet entities and will show why the supporting arguments are more persuasive.  
Specifically, this paper takes the position that the FFIA, as recently amended, appropriately 
protects online entities.  Section III will detail that the FFIA’s “covered journalist” definition 
provides appropriate protection to bloggers. 
 
 
                                                          
22
 See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013). 
23
 See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013). 
24
 See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013). 
25
 See Bazelon, supra note 15. 
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Section III 
Bloggers are Protected by the FFIA’s “Covered Journalist” Definition 
With respect to the implementation of a federal media shield law, judges, senators, and 
witnesses alike have expressed concerns about federal courts defining “journalist” in light of new 
avenues of reporting via the internet.
26
  District of Columbia Circuit Judge Sentelle articulated 
the conundrum federal courts face in defining “journalist,” stating that: 
Are we then to create a privilege that protects only those reporters employed by 
Time Magazine, the New York Times, and other media giants, or do we extend 
that protection as well to the owner of a desktop printer producing a weekly 
newsletter to inform his neighbors, lodge brothers, co-religionists, or co-
conspirators?  Perhaps more to the point today, does the privilege also protect the 
proprietor of a web log: the stereotypical ‘blogger’ sitting in his pajamas at his 
personal computer posting on the World Wide Web his best product to inform 
whoever happens to browse his way? If not, why not? How could one draw a 
distinction consistent with the court's vision of a broadly granted personal right?
27
 
 
Other critics of a federal media shield argue that “faced with this technological moving target… 
the doctrine is destined to be mired in definitional difficulties in at least some cases, and likely in 
a growing number of them.”28  Those opinions are premised on inconsistent findings of 
reporters’ privilege in federal courts varying from broad to narrow classifications of protected 
journalists.
29
  Although the wide spectrum of individuals in the blogosphere poses an obstacle to 
federal courts, it is overcome by enacting legislation that focuses on whether the newsgathering 
function is performed. 
The foregoing reservations about defining “journalist” in light of the amorphous 
blogosphere are “unfounded for a federal shield law.”30  Whereas definitional concerns are 
                                                          
26
 See James Thomas Tucker & Stephen Wermiel, Enacting A Reasonable Federal Shield Law: A Reply to 
Professors Clymer and Eliason, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1291, 1312 (2008). 
27
 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1156-1157 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Sentelle, J., 
concurring). 
28
 See RonNell Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter's Privilege, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 1221, 1241-1242 (2013). 
29
 Id. at 1241. 
30
 See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 26, at 1312. 
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understandable, they are inconsequential here if Congress’ definition of covered journalists 
focuses on the function being performed.
31
  Gregg Leslie, Legal Director for the Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, has stated that Congress should concentrate on 
functionality, specifically explaining that “[t]he medium doesn't answer the question. It has to do 
more with the function that the person is performing… If the Bloggers' involvement is to report 
information to the public and to gather information for that purpose openly then they should be 
treated like a journalist.”32  Accordingly, in consideration of continually changing means 
spawned by the internet like blogs, Congress can address definitional concerns by delineating 
“what the person seeking coverage as a journalist was doing when he or she received the 
information being subpoenaed, and not on the medium of communication they used for their 
stories, such as blogging.”33 
First, the plain language of the FFIA’s definition of “covered journalist” shows such a 
focus on the newsgathering function.  The September 12, 2013 amendment to the FFIA defines 
“covered journalist” as an employee, independent contractor, or agent of an entity that 
disseminates news or information “by means of… news website, mobile application, or other 
news or information service… with the primary intent to investigate events and procure 
material… in the regular gathering, preparing, collecting, photographing, recording, writing, 
editing, reporting, or publishing on such matters.”34 
As such, “covered journalist” embraces the functional approach suggested by Gregg 
Leslie, overcoming concerns that bloggers are not appropriately protected.  Importantly, the 
                                                          
31
 Id. 
32
 Id (quoting FixYourThinking.com, Are Bloggers Journalists?, http://jackwhispers.blogspot.com/2006/03/are-
bloggers-journalists-courts-seem.html (Mar. 28, 2006)). 
33
 Id. at 1313. 
34
 See United States Senate: Committee on the Judiciary, Judiciary.Senate.gov (Sep. 12, 2013), 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/legislation/mediashield/Feinstein/ALB13767.pdf. 
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bill’s plain language explicitly requires that to qualify for protection, a “covered journalist” must 
possess intent to gather news or information and disseminate it to the public.
35
  Recognizing that 
the FFIA’s focus on newsgathering provides protection to deserving bloggers, Kurt Wimmer, 
general counsel for the Newspaper Association of America, wrote “[t]rue, the blogger at issue 
would have to be practicing journalism – which is the test that bloggers seem to prefer.”36  The 
focus on newsgathering is beneficial for bloggers because it is likely that the circumstances 
under which a blogger seeks FFIA protection of confidential sources also entail gathering, 
recording, or publishing news or information.
37
 
Next, the FFIA contains another avenue to qualify as a “covered journalist” which 
likewise applies the functional standard.  Under this section, a “covered journalist” is a person 
who “at the inception of the process of gathering the news or information sought had the primary 
intent to investigate issues or events and procure material in order to disseminate to the public 
news or information” and “was an employee, independent contractor, or agent of an entity or 
service that disseminates news or information… for any continuous one-year period within the 
20 years prior to the relevant date or any continuous three-month period within the 5 years prior 
to the relevant date.”38  Additionally, “a student participating in a journalistic medium at an 
institution of higher education on the relevant date” is covered.39 
This section’s plain language ensures coverage to parties who gather and disseminate 
news with reasonably recent and sufficient experience in so doing.  For purposes of protecting 
freelance and independent bloggers this section crucially allows for the prior experience to be as 
                                                          
35
 See Bazelon, supra note 15. 
36
 See Kurt Wimmer, The Senate’s media shield bill protects bloggers and they should support it, GigaOM.com 
(Sep. 21, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://gigaom.com/2013/09/21/the-senates-media-shield-bill-protects-bloggers-and-they-
should-support-it/; See Bazelon, supra note 15. 
37
 See Wimmer, supra note 36. 
38
 See United States Senate: Committee on the Judiciary (Sep. 12, 2013). 
39
 See United States Senate: Committee on the Judiciary (Sep. 12, 2013). 
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an independent contractor.  Just as important to the blogosphere, this section covers only those 
who intend to carry out the newsgathering function.  Accordingly, by not tethering this section’s 
coverage to just established media outlets, Congress has authorized federal courts to protect 
bloggers who have informal but effective work experience performing the newsgathering 
function. 
The FFIA’s “covered journalist” provision nevertheless has generated polarizing 
assessments.  For instance, Matt Drudge, creator and editor of news aggregator the Drudge 
Report, took to Twitter with sharp criticism of the bill’s amendment, writing that “[g]ov’t 
declaring who qualifies for freedom of press in digital age is ridiculous! It belongs to anyone for 
any reason. No amendment necessary.”40  Drudge further noted that a “[f]ederal judge once ruled 
Drudge ‘is not a journalist, a reporter, or a newsgatherer.’ Millions of readers come a day for 
cooking recipes??!”41  Finally, Drudge pointedly disparaged Senator Dianne Feinstein for her 
remarks supporting the amendment, writing that ““[c]omments from Sen. Feinstein yesterday on 
who's a reporter were disgusting. 17-year old 'blogger' is as important as Wolf Blitzer. Fascist!”42 
Matt Drudge’s ridicule of the government defining “covered journalist” is likely derived 
from his experience in federal court.  In Blumenthal v. Drudge, the United States District Court 
was confronted with a defamation action involving statements Drudge published on the 
internet.
43
  There, Blumenthal alleged that Drudge made defamatory remarks on America Online 
through his electronic publication, the Drudge Report, a gossip column “focusing on gossip from 
Hollywood and Washington D.C.
44
  Drudge’s purported defamatory statements provided that 
Blumenthal, recently appointed Assistant to President Obama, had previously abused his 
                                                          
40
 See Matt Drudge, Twitter (Sep. 13, 2013), https://twitter.com/DRUDGE. 
41
 See Drudge, Twitter (Sep. 13, 2013). 
42
 See Drudge, Twitter (Sep. 13, 2013). 
43
 See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D.D.C. 1998). 
44
 Id. at 46-47. 
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spouse.
45
  America Online, Inc. filed a motion for summary judgment and Drudge filed a motion 
to dismiss or transfer for lack of personal jurisdiction.
46
 
The United States District Court granted America Online’s motion and denied Drudge’s 
motion.
47
  In granting America Online’s motion for summary judgment, the court determined 
that Congress intended for the Communications Decency Act to provide immunity for the 
internet service provider “even where the [ISP] has an active, even aggressive role in making 
available content prepared by others.”48  The court noted that such immunity was intended to 
promote self-policing of internet service providers and extends “even where the self-policing is 
unsuccessful or not even attempted.”49  Further, in denying Drudge’s motion to dismiss or 
transfer for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court found that Drudge satisfied the District of 
Columbia Long-Arm statute.
50
 
More significantly, the court found that Drudge did not qualify under the news gathering 
exception of the Long-Arm statute, noting that “Drudge is not a reporter, journalist or 
newsgatherer. He is, as he himself admits, simply a purveyor of gossip.”51  Drudge referenced 
that determination in his aforementioned tweet where he criticized the FFIA’s amended 
definition of “covered journalist.”  But, upon motions by both parties to compel discovery 
including information regarding Drudge’s sources, the District Court assumed that Drudge 
qualified for the reporters’ privilege under the First Amendment.52  That assumption is evidenced 
                                                          
45
 Id. at 46. 
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. 
48
 Id. at 52. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. at 57. 
51
 Id. 
52
 See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 186 F.R.D. 236, 244-245 (D.D.C. 1999). 
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in the finding that Blumenthal failed to meet his burden to compel Drudge’s disclosure by not 
exhausting all reasonable alternative sources of the information.
53
 
The court’s review of Drudge’s reporters’ privilege claim “without questioning or 
discussing Drudge’s qualifications” demonstrates that Drudge was a newsperson for purposes of 
the First Amendment despite not meeting the news gathering exception of the Long-Arm 
statute.
54
  Ultimately the parties reached a settlement in which Blumenthal paid Drudge a sum of 
money for travel costs.
55
  Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme Court found “the Drudge 
Report has evolved into a forum that shares similarities to traditional media” and used it as an 
example of reporting that would satisfy the state’s shield law.56  Therefore it is clear that 
Drudge’s tweets in which he infers he was deemed not a journalist are misguided in the context 
of reporters’ privilege. 
Reactions to Drudge’s criticism from those within legal and online communities show 
that the FFIA provides reasonable protection to bloggers.  Soon after Drudge’s comments, 
several proponents of the bill’s impact on bloggers candidly responded.57  For example, Emily 
Bazelon, Senior Research Fellow at Yale Law School and Senior Editor at online magazine 
Slate, explained that protection under the bill’s recent amendment does not require work for 
pay.
58
  While the precise word “blog” is not written in the bill, bloggers likely will be protected 
as state shield laws with similar broad language to the FFIA’s have afforded such protection.59  
Next, Wimmer also directly addressed Drudge’s mistaken insinuations that the bill would have a 
                                                          
53
 Id. at 245. 
54
 See Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal Limiting the Newsgathering 
Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for Sources and Information, 20 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 97, 
136 (2002). 
55
 Id. 
56
 See Too Much Media, 206 N.J. at 237. 
57
 See Wimmer, supra note 36. 
58
 See Bazelon, supra note 15. 
59
 See Bazelon, supra note 15. 
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negative impact on bloggers, stating “[w]ell, no.  The bill does protect bloggers, which is why 
the Online News Association supports it.”60 
Furthermore, the FFIA’s judicial discretion provision resolves any lingering concerns that 
the bill does not protect bloggers.  This equitable provision states that a federal judge “may 
exercise discretion to avail the person of the protections of this Act if… the judge determines that 
such protections would be in the interest of justice and necessary to protect lawful and legitimate 
news-gathering activities under the specific circumstances of the case.”61  Thus, even assuming a 
blogger unfairly falls outside the scope of the aforementioned “covered journalist” provision, 
fairness principles dictate that the judge provide protection.  Stated differently, the amendment’s 
broad judicial discretion provision allows a federal court to carry out justice when appropriate.  
Wimmer suggested that implementing this safety valve in conjunction with the functional 
approach provides reasonable protection to bloggers, writing that: 
Some claim that anyone at all should be considered a journalist. But under this 
bill, anyone can be covered as a journalist, as long as the writer is actually 
committing journalism. Those who claim anyone at all must be covered are really 
suggesting a poison pill to kill any privilege. It’s naïve to suggest that Congress 
would pass a privilege that applies to everyone.
62
 
 
Even some past skeptics have acknowledged the judicial discretion provision’s positive impact 
on the protection afforded bloggers.  For instance, David Greene, Senior Staff Attorney to digital 
rights group Electronic Frontier Foundation, argued that the amendment’s judicial discretion 
provision extends greater protection to bloggers than any previous federal shield bill, arguing 
that: 
The importance of this provision cannot be overstated. It provides an avenue for 
non-mainstream and citizen journalists to demonstrate that they are deserving of 
the shield, even if they otherwise fall outside the law’s strict definition of 
                                                          
60
 See Wimmer, supra note 36. 
61
 See United States Senate: Committee on the Judiciary (Sep. 12, 2013). 
62
 See Wimmer, supra note 36. 
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“covered journalist.” Thus, those journalists who may not have been covered by 
the 2009 law, such as first–time freelancers or self-publishers who cannot prove a 
connection to an “entity,” are not automatically excluded.63 
 
The judicial discretion section is an avenue vital to the reasonable coverage of the 
blogosphere.  It specifically empowers a federal judge to protect the legitimate newsgathering 
performance.  In conjunction with the “covered journalist” definition, the judicial discretion 
provision authorizes a federal judge to achieve Congress’ intention of protecting the gathering 
and transmission of news.  Federal courts are provided flexibility to cover the array of 
independent and freelance bloggers who do not satisfy the plain language of a “covered 
journalist” but nonetheless deserve protection pursuant to Congress’ intent.  Accordingly, the 
judicial discretion provision allows for elastic application of Congress’ intent within the 
blogosphere. 
In sum, the FFIA’s focus on the newsgathering function in its “covered journalist” 
definition empowers a federal court to reasonably and accurately protect bloggers.  The FFIA’s 
judicial discretion provision furthers the bill’s flexible application to the blogosphere. Therefore, 
Congress has effectively legislated to allow the judiciary’s appropriate protection of online 
entities.  Section IV will show that the FFIA likely would have covered bloggers who have been 
left unprotected in the past without it.  
Section IV 
Bloggers have no Protection Absent the FFIA 
Past instances involving bloggers unsuccessfully asserting reporters’ privilege indicate 
that online entities would be better protected with the FFIA than without it.  In a well-known 
example, blogger and freelance video journalist Joshua Wolf was jailed for 226 days, the longest 
                                                          
63
 See David Greene, Senate Revises Media Shield Law for the Better, But It’s Still Imperfect, EFF.org (Sep. 20, 
2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/senate-revises-media-shield-law-better-its-still-imperfect. 
14 
 
incarceration of an American journalist in a contempt case.
64
  There, Wolf videotaped an anti-
capitalist protest in San Francisco and posted some of the footage on his website.
65
  Wolf was 
subpoenaed by a federal grand jury to testify and to produce unreleased portions of the 
videotape.
66
  The grand jury believed that Wolf’s unpublished footage might reveal the 
perpetrators who allegedly set fire to a police car during the protest.
67
 
In filing a motion to quash the subpoena, Wolf argued that the First Amendment afforded 
him a shield to his newsgathering materials.
68
  The Ninth Circuit denied Wolf’s motion and 
refused to “alter the long-established obligation of a reporter to comply with grand jury 
subpoenas.”69  Notably, the court’s decision focused on privilege lacking under Branzburg, not 
on whether Wolf was a journalist.
70
  Wolf still refused to produce the videotape and was jailed, 
becoming the first blogger to be jailed for failing to comply with a grand jury subpoena.
71
  Wolf 
spent eight months in jail until his release once he provided the unpublished footage.
72
 
Following his release, Joshua Wolf stated the government abandoning their demand that 
he testify was essential to his compliance in turning over the unreleased videotape.
73
  Wolf spoke 
to the importance of protecting journalists from being compelled to testify, reasoning that 
“[j]ournalists absolutely have to remain independent of law enforcement. Otherwise, people will 
                                                          
64
 See Stephanie B. Turner, Protecting Citizen Journalists: Why Congress Should Adopt A Broad Federal Shield 
Law, 30 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 503 (2012). 
65
 See Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and Fourth Estate Inmates: The Misguided Pursuit of A Reporter's 
Privilege, 24 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 385, 446 (2006). 
66
 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 201 F. App'x 430, 431 (9th Cir. 2006). 
67
 Id. 
68
 Id. at 432. 
69
 Id. at 433. 
70
 See Eliason, supra note 65, at 446. 
71
 Id. 
72
 See Turner, supra note 64, at 503. 
73
 See Bob Egelko & Jim Herron Zamora, The Josh Wolf Case: Blogger Freed after Giving Video to Feds, 
www.SFgate.com (Apr. 4, 2007), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/THE-JOSH-WOLF-CASE-Blogger-freed-
after-giving-2576757.php. 
15 
 
never trust journalists.”74  Wolf further explained “[a]bsolutely this was worth it. I would do it 
again if I had to” and he expressed “the need for a federal shield law that would protect 
journalists, including bloggers, from having to disclose confidential sources or unpublished 
material.”75 
Wolf would have been provided such federal protection had the FFIA been in existence at 
the time he was subpoenaed.  A federal shield law covering those who “engage in journalist 
activities such as gathering and disseminating news” would have protected Wolf’s right of 
confidentiality to his sources and videotape.
76
  Moreover, the “mainstream media” has defended 
Wolf, contending that “he is a journalist entitled to the protections of any applicable reporters’ 
privilege” and The Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press even “filed an amicus brief 
on Wolf’s behalf.”77  Judith Miller, a journalist for the New York Times who likewise was held 
in contempt for refusing to comply with a subpoena, “expressed [her] solidarity as a fellow 
journalist” in support of Wolf.78  Accordingly, the FFIA’s focus on intent to perform the 
newsgathering function clearly places Wolf’s investigative footage and dissemination on his 
website within its scope, irrespective of Wolf’s status as an independent freelance video 
journalist and blogger. 
Because the investigation of the protestors for which Wolf was subpoenaed involved a 
criminal case,
79
 under the FFIA the government would have been required to make three 
showings by a preponderance of the evidence.
80
  The prosecution would have had to show they 
“exhausted all reasonable alternative sources” for the unpublished footage, that there were 
                                                          
74
 Id. 
75
 Id. 
76
 See Turner, supra note 64, at 517. 
77
 See Eliason, supra note 65, at 446. 
78
 Id. 
79
 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 201 F. App'x at 433. 
80
 See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013). 
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“reasonable grounds to believe a crime occurred,” and that there were “reasonable grounds to 
believe” the unpublished footage was “essential to the resolution of the matter.”81  If successfully 
proven, the burden would have shifted to Wolf to show by “clear and convincing evidence that 
disclosure” of the unpublished footage “would be contrary to the public interest, taking into 
account both the public interest in gathering and disseminating the news and maintaining the free 
flow of information and the public interest in compelling disclosure” of the unpublished 
footage.
82
  Rather, the prosecution was actually required to show by “clear and convincing 
evidence that there was an authorized request for information by the grand jury, the information 
sought was relevant to the proceeding, the information sought was not already in the 
government’s possession, and Wolf failed to comply with the request.”83  The prosecution met its 
burden to issue a grand jury subpoena to Wolf.
84
 
Critically, the FFIA would have permitted Wolf to show that compelling disclosure of his 
unpublished footage was contrary to the public interest.
85
  Wolf was unable to assert any such 
statutory privilege absent the FFIA and was relegated to making constitutionally based 
arguments which federal courts have routinely rejected since Branzburg.
86
  As such, Wolf’s right 
of confidentiality in his unpublished recordings as a freelance video journalist and blogger would 
have been better served under the FFIA.  In that case, even after the government met its burden it 
would have shifted to Wolf and provided an opportunity for him to argue a position not 
customarily denied in federal court.  In other words, the blogger who was jailed under a 
contempt order longer than any other American journalist to date may have avoided going to jail 
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altogether had the FFIA been enacted.  Wolf at least would have been more vindicated under the 
FFIA by a court’s order in favor of the government and might have complied with the subpoena 
at an earlier date. 
However, the FFIA is not all encompassing as it “bites as WikiLeaks.”87  WikiLeaks was 
launched in 2006 by Julian Assange and has “released hundreds of thousands of confidential 
government documents relating to a wide variety of subject.”88  WikiLeaks releases have 
involved “U.S. standard operating procedure in Guantanamo Bay, secret Scientology ‘bibles,’ 
Sarah Palin’s Yahoo! Account, footage of a July 2007 Baghdad airstrike that killed Iraqi 
journalists, and over 75,000 previously unpublished documents about the war in Afghanistan.”89 
WikiLeaks entry “into the national consciousness has introduced a new sense of urgency 
to the debate about the proper scope of blogger protection.”90  The FFIA has resolved that debate 
with a section that directly addresses online entities like WikiLeaks.  Specifically, that section of 
the FFIA excludes from its coverage “any person or entity whose principal function… is to 
publish primary source documents that have been disclosed to such person or entity without 
authorization.”91  Critics of this section contend that WikiLeaks “has played a big watchdog 
role” but acknowledge “it’s not worth killing the bill over this clause.”92  WikiLeaks “actually 
could be covered, by doing more editing, so that it’s not just about document dumps.”93  
Accordingly, entering the realm of investigative journalism may allow WikiLeaks to invoke 
privilege under the FFIA. 
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In conclusion, Josh Wolf epitomizes the blogosphere’s need for the FFIA.  Wolf’s right 
of confidentiality is vindicated under the FFIA and a federal court would have been practically 
authorized to quash the subpoena.  Also while WikiLeaks is pointedly excluded from the bill’s 
scope, there is a clear opportunity for WikiLeaks to conform to the newsgathering function 
requirement.  These prior instances represent the need for the FFIA to protect online entities.  
Next, Section V contends that similarly constructed state shield laws suggest the FFIA would 
appropriately protect bloggers. 
Section V 
Similarly Constructed State Shield Laws Sufficiently Protect Bloggers 
Several state courts have afforded online entities coverage under state shield statutes.  
Prior to the Branzburg decision, media shield laws had already been instituted in seventeen states 
across the country.
94
  This section will examine state court interpretations of media shield laws 
and will argue that bloggers’ would be afforded similar protection under the FFIA in federal 
court. 
The initial case addressing whether a state shield law considered bloggers as journalists 
was adjudicated in California.
95
  There, in O’Grady v. Superior Court, Jason O’Grady provided 
news and information about software and hardware for Apple computers via “O’Grady’s 
PowerPage,” his owned and operated online news magazine.96  Apple claimed that O’Grady was 
liable for misappropriation of trade secrets after he posted four articles to the website which 
discussed “a rumored new product that Apple was about to release which would facilitate the 
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recording of digital live sound on Apple computers.”97  Apple sought a subpoena compelling 
O’Grady to reveal his sources but the court denied Apple’s application, finding that O’Grady had 
a right of confidentiality in his sources.
98
 
The court addressed that the state legislature contemplated protection of websites such as 
O’Grady’s PowerPage, since the website was “highly analogous to printed publications” which 
were protected under the shield law.
99
  The court was persuaded that websites such as O’Grady’s 
employed “a kind and degree of editorial control” akin to printed publications which were 
already protected under the statute.
100
  For instance, only O’Grady, not anonymous posters, was 
capable of posting the four articles at issue to O’Grady’s PowerPage.101 
The state court’s decision in O’Grady shows that a statutory concentration on 
functionality empowers a court to protect bloggers’ right of confidentiality.  The court found no 
“colorable ground for declaring [O’Grady’s] activities not to be legitimate newsgathering and 
dissemination.”  Further, the court explained “[i]f [O’Grady’s] activities and social function 
differ at all from those of traditional print and broadcast journalists, the distinctions are minute, 
subtle, and constitutionally immaterial.”102  Even Randall D. Eliason, who opposes enactment of 
a federal media shield, postulated that “[a] functional approach to determining who qualifies as a 
journalist, similar to the approach followed by the court in O’Grady, is the solution most 
consistent with the values purportedly protected by the privilege.”103  O’Grady’s evaluation 
under California’s shield law of functional analogues between bloggers and traditional media 
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outlets, such as editorial control, parallels an analysis under the FFIA of one’s intent to gather 
and disseminate news.  Accordingly, the O’Grady court’s finding suggests that had those 
identical facts been adjudicated in federal court pursuant to the FFIA his right of confidentiality 
would have likewise been preserved. 
Next, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale 
similarly indicates that the FFIA would reasonably provide federal protection of bloggers’ right 
of confidentiality.  Too Much Media considered the scope of online speakers covered by New 
Jersey’s shield law.104  The court specifically decided “whether the newspersons’ privilege 
extends to a self-described journalist who posted comments on an internet message board.”105  
Hale made allegedly defamatory statements on Oprano.com, an online platform where anyone 
with internet access could post unfiltered comments about the adult entertainment industry.
106
  
Hale decided to investigate “criminal activity in the online adult entertainment industry” after 
she was exposed to “cyber flashers” while working as a life coach.107  Her investigation focused 
on a security breach of Too Much Media’s database.108  Hale’s detailed probe of the breach 
consisted of interviewing people in the adult entertainment industry, collecting information from 
porn blogs, speaking with the offices of the Washington State Attorney General, and attending 
six adult industry trade shows.
109
  Hale then posted the statements at issue on Oprano’s message 
board and Too Much Media filed suit, demanding information about the sources upon which 
Hale relied.
110
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The New Jersey Supreme Court found that Hale did not fall within the state shield law’s 
scope of coverage.
111
  New Jersey’s shield law protected “a person engaged on, engaged in, 
connected with, or employed by news media for the purpose of gathering, procuring, 
transmitting, compiling, editing, or disseminating news for the general public.”112  The court 
recognized that the statute’s application was not limited to traditional news sources, though it 
required the means of disseminating news to be similar to “newspapers, magazines, and the 
like.”113  As such, the court concluded that Hale’s sources were not protected because her 
postings to the Oprano message board were “not the functional equivalent of the types of news 
media outlets outlined in the shield law.”114  The court explained that “message boards are little 
more than forums for conversation” and “[n]either writing a letter to the editor nor posting 
comment on an online message board establishes the connection with “news media” required by 
the statute.
115
 
While Hale was not covered by New Jersey’s shield law, Too Much Media nonetheless 
provided that digital media providers may qualify for protection.  The court recognized “[c]ertain 
online sites could satisfy the law's standards.”116  Specifically, the court explained that “[a] single 
blogger might qualify for coverage under the Shield Law provided [that blogger meets] the 
statute's criteria” but determined that Hale’s circumstances did not meet the statute’s required 
nexus to “news media.”117  In delineating the types of online sites that would satisfy New Jersey 
shield law’s standards, the court used California’s decision in O’Grady v. Superior Court as an 
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example.
118
  The court explained that O’Grady protected comments by a website operator on an 
open and deliberate publication of his news oriented website, rendering the website 
“conceptually indistinguishable from publishing a newspaper” under California’s shield law.119  
The court further clarified that O’Grady “pointedly contrasted the site with the deposit of 
information, opinion, or fabrication by a casual visitor to an open forum such as a newsgroup, 
chat room, bulletin board system, or discussion group.”120  Too Much Media’s recognition of 
those distinctions in O’Grady exemplifies that protection under either state shield law depended 
on whether the blogger performed the journalistic function, like editorial control of the news’ 
dissemination. 
Accordingly, the FFIA is similar in construction and application to the shield laws 
examined in Too Much Media and O’Grady.  The Too Much Media court’s example of O’Grady 
as a blogger who would have satisfied New Jersey’s shield law shows similar statutory 
interpretations in both states.  Both shield laws “resemble the functional approach in that they 
cover individuals who engage in journalist activities.”121  Too Much Media was not convinced 
that Hale exercised “editorial control over Oprano” and deemed “her contributions were like 
letters to the editor that simply comment on articles.”122  Those courts’ concentration under the 
shield laws on editorial control parallels the FFIA’s intent to perform the newsgathering function 
addressed in Section III of this paper. 
Importantly, it is unreasonable to expect all online entities to be protected by a state or 
federal shield law.  As Bazelon and Wimmer have posited, it’s unrealistic to visualize a shield 
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law which grants anyone a blanket exemption from court orders.
123
  The New Jersey shield law 
in Too Much Media protected bloggers who performed the newsgathering function and 
appropriately found that Hale did not satisfy that requirement.  On that note, Editor-in-Chief of 
Loyola Law School’s law review Joshua Rich explained that: 
A blogger who follows these standards should fall under the definition of a 
journalist who merits shield-law protection. But a message-board commenter like 
Shellee Hale, who fails to give his or her subject the opportunity to respond to 
attacks-- among other journalistic failures--should not qualify for the privilege.
124
 
Further, Too Much Media identified that the shield law’s “similarity standard” requiring the 
blog’s dissemination of information to be similar to the dissemination of information by 
traditional news media “would cover many other citizen journalists.”125  Consequently, a shield 
law’s concentration on performing the newsgathering function permits a wide enough scope of 
coverage to protect deserving online entities. 
 The state shield laws application in Too Much Media and O’Grady demonstrate that the 
FFIA would cover online entities deserving of protection.  Too Much Media would have likely 
been decided the same on the merits in federal court under the FFIA because posts to a message 
board do not rise to the standard of “primary intent to investigate events and procure 
materials.”126  Blogs over which editorial control is exerted “do not facilitate the journalistic 
function in the same way” as “message boards and other online media through which citizen 
journalists might disseminate information--such as chat rooms, instant messaging platforms, and 
Facebook.”  The Too Much Media court expressed concern that “anyone with a Facebook 
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account could try to assert the privilege.”127  The distinction pursuant to a functional standard 
between blogging and merely posting content would operate no differently in federal court under 
the FFIA’s intent requirement.  Thus, those who satisfy the FFIA’s requirement would abide by 
journalistic standards in turn fostering efficient newsgathering. 
Last, the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s decision in Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. 
Implode-Explode Heavy Indus., Inc. signifies judicial willingness to protect online entities and 
users.  There, the court considered an online entity’s constitutionally based argument for 
qualified reporters’ privilege.128  Plaintiff Mortgage Specialists, Inc. (“Mortgage Specialists”) 
was a mortgage lender and Defendant Implode-Explode Heavy Industries, Inc. (“Implode”) 
operated a website which ranked businesses in the mortgage industry.
129
  Implode’s website, 
www.ml-implode.com, categorized “at risk” companies and permitted registered users “to post 
publicly viewable comments about lenders.”130  Implode published an article in 2008 which 
discussed actions taken by the New Hampshire Banking Department against Mortgage 
Specialists and incorporated a link purporting to represent Mortgage Specialists’ 2007 loan 
figures.
131
  An anonymous user registered to the website, “Brianbattersby,” responded to the 
publication with two comments about Mortgage Specialists and its President.
132
 
Mortgage Specialists filed for injunctive relief and alleged that the comments by 
“Brianbattersby” were defamatory and false.133  After the trial court granted Mortgage 
Specialists’ relief, Implode argued on appeal that “ordering it to disclose the identities of the 
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Loan Chart source and Brianbattersby's postings” infringed both the First Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution and New Hampshire’s Constitution.134  In vacating and remanding the trial 
court’s ordered disclosure of the Loan Chart’s source, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
found that the trial court failed to consider the applicability of the qualified newsgathering 
privilege.
135
  The court determined that Implode was a reporter for purposes of the 
newsgathering privilege as “Implode's website serves an informative function and contributes to 
the flow of information to the public.”136  Thus, Implode was a “legitimate publisher of 
information” and “[t]he fact that Implode operates a website makes it no less a member of the 
press.”137 
Additionally, the court vacated and remanded the trial court’s order requiring the 
disclosure of Brianbattersby’s identity.138  The court espoused “a standard for trial courts to 
apply when a plaintiff requests disclosure of the identity of an anonymous defendant who has 
posted allegedly defamatory material on the Internet.”139  That test requires the trial court to 
“balance the defendant's First Amendment right of anonymous free speech” against “the 
necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant's identity to allow the plaintiff to 
properly proceed.”140 
This case shows the judiciary’s readiness to enforce a newsgathering privilege.  While 
Mortgage Specialists was not decided on the merits, the court nonetheless concentrated on 
Implode’s legitimate newsgathering performance and directly found its status as a website was 
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immaterial.  There was not even a statutory basis for the court’s finding as the newsgathering 
privilege was invoked pursuant to the Constitution.
141
  Moreover, the court even found it within 
their power to extend the privilege to a third party poster “Brianbattersby” upon remand.142  It is 
likely that under the FFIA Implode’s right of confidentiality in the Loan Chart source and 
Brianbattersby's identity would have been preserved as Implode performed according to 
journalistic standards by exhibiting editorial control. 
Overall, the foregoing state decisions suggest that the internet community should 
embrace the FFIA.  The courts’ findings in New Jersey and California exemplify the 
blogosphere’s protection under similarly constructed state shield laws.  The New Hampshire 
court’s analysis of reporters’ privilege under constitutional parameters shows judicial readiness 
to preserve journalists’ right of confidentiality even without a shield law.  These cases make it 
reasonably foreseeable that the FFIA will protect bloggers in federal court. 
Section VI 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this paper has been to support the position that online entities within the 
blogosphere would be appropriately protected under the FFIA.  As previously discussed, the 
news media’s unsuccessful litigation in federal courts over recent years has prompted resort to 
Congress for protection.  The FFIA’s plain language overcomes reservations about enacting a 
federal media shield and thus affords protection to deserving bloggers.  Previous instances in 
which bloggers have futilely asserted reporters’ privilege would have been more meritorious 
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under the FFIA.  Finally, similarly constructed state shield laws that were found to protect 
deserving bloggers suggest the FFIA would be interpreted no differently in federal courts.  
Therefore, the online community should excuse the FFIA’s negligible flaws and support its 
institution.  
